Dear
Sirs,
The
concluding
report on Trident has already met with much justified criticism (
here
and
here)
so the intent of this email is not to duplicate that which has already been
made, but to extend the argument against Trident along an important direction
which is avoided by politicians of all political parties in all nuclear weapon
states. This relates to the nexus of nuclear weapons and climate change and
there is a global silence on this.
To put
this in the context of the commissioners report, climate change is only
mentioned twice. Their discussion is limited to the statement, "the effects of climate change and
major damage to fragile ecosystems upon which we depend could all exacerbate
pressures towards conflict and insecurity." As such the uncertainties
of climate change are then used as justification for a Trident replacement.
However, this highly superficial consideration of it avoids recognition of the
timescales and the impacts that we face as a society, both nationally and
globally.
The
following three indisputable facts are absent from your consideration, yet they
must form the framework for any decision on nuclear weapon deployments.
- There is compelling evidence that atmospheric
CO2 started increasing super exponentially from 2009. Given this increased
rate, we will exceed 450 ppm some time between 2020 and 2030. At this
level the worst nightmares of runaway climate change will be impossible to
avoid.
- The
resulting global heating will be so severe that a total economic collapse
will occur long before 2050.
- New evidence on the instability of the Antarctic and
Greenland Ice sheets suggests that sea level rises well in excess of 20
feet will be experienced before the end of this century. This will wipe
out the global economic base that has not already collapsed from severe
global heating. It is a statement
of the obvious to say that along with this will go the submarines bases at
Faslane and elsewhere in the world.
It
is against this background of certain ecological and economic collapse by 2050,
that the commissioners report attempts to justify the decision to procure
Trident so we can maintain the ability to destroy the planet with nuclear
weapons long after we have destroyed it through climate change.
In
this context there are three fundamental questions that any democracy should be
forced to collectively consider before proceeding with nuclear weapons
deployment of any kind, these are:
- Will climate change make nuclear disarmament
more difficult?
- As economies collapse from climate change
will nuclear weapon states be able to afford to maintain their weapons
systems safe from attack and accident?
- On the assumption that nuclear weapons are
not used, will they become an eternal liability for the survivors
struggling to make ends meet in the new hostile and dystopian environment
that climate change will bring?
To
some extent your commissioners have answered the first question with their
conclusion that the insecurity inherent with climate change makes the case for
Trident. However, what they have not acknowledged is that climate change will
continue to get much worse as time progress and will do so with increasing
rapidity. By their logic, it means that
if we do not have the courage to seize
the slender opportunity in front of us today to rid ourselves of nuclear
weapons it will not return in the future.
Time will expose their strategy of
a "glide path towards disarmament" to be little more
than a set of complex words designed to sound plausible.
In
respect to the second question, all the main economic blocks are already
struggling with maintaining energy supplies. This is driving recognition of the
fundamental impossibility of maintaining exponential growth in a constrained
world. The banking crisis of 2008 warned the global economy was inherently
fragile.
Another similar collapse is
inevitable within the lifetime of the next generation of nuclear submarines and
there is far less prospect that an economic recovery will be engineered
through increased taxation and
quantitative easing. In its aftermath, the things that we take for granted will
disappear such as the conventional defence forces necessary to protect the only
submarine we will have on patrol and a political system free of extreme right
wing tendencies. The confluence of these could lead to an unpredictable set of
events that may lead to a premature launch.
To
answer the third question above, we need to consider the strategy that the
world's nuclear weapons states are collectively, but silently, working towards.
This is that the possession of nuclear weapons prevents war, but the planet is
destroyed through the collective failure to make climate change
agreements. This "best case"
of avoiding nuclear war is the Easter Island scenario where the few survivors
of today's civilisation are left to wonder at the scale of the nuclear weapons
systems left behind, especially the ballistic submarines, and the inherent
madness of the building these in the face of the overwhelming evidence of
economic and ecological collapse. The ballistic submarines thus replicate the
history of Easter Island, where huge statues were built as statements of hubris
and vanity in the face of collapse.
Those that are struggling to survive in a future roasting environment
with little food, water or energy will also have to decommission nuclear
submarines; a feat that today all the nuclear weapon states are struggling with
in much kinder circumstances.
In
a circular argument, where climate change forces difficult questions that make
it impossible to pursue nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons also make it
impossible to achieve the climate change agreements that we need to avoid the
worst nightmares of the future.
The
fundamental dilemma all nuclear weapons states face is that to maintain a
credible nuclear force, be it a force of one or one thousand nuclear warheads
on deployment, a massive military industrial complex must be maintained. As
well as building the actual nuclear weapon systems, it must also provide the
conventional defence screen consisting of fighter jets, patrols planes,
anti-submarine warfare technology etc. In an ultimate irony, the purpose of
these becomes to defend the nuclear forces to ensure a second strike can be
launched rather than to defend people, because there is no defence against a
determined nuclear attack. The military industrial complex that delivers this
equipment must be continually feed with new streams of contracts at increasing
values otherwise the industrial complex collapses. Thus a key objective in the
initial gate document which justified to parliament the early procurement of material for Trident was that, "We must retain the capability
to design, build and support nuclear submarines and meet the commitment for a successor
to the Vanguard Class submarines." In other words, we build Tridents to continue
building Tridents.
The enormous cost of this
needs to be covered by taxes, and for this some £500 billion of additional
excess economic activity is needed which requires energy from fossil fuels and
is the antithesis of making the urgent cut backs we need to tackle the soaring
greenhouse gas overburden. Thus once
the decision is made to proceed with Trident, it becomes impossible to make the
climate change agreements to save the planet. In this context Trident is more
dangerous than we ever first thought and it is the ultimate Faustian bargain.
Your commissioners have also
failed to acknowledge in their report that the public spending that will be
needed on Trident must be made at the same times as scarce public funds must be
diverted to building a low carbon economy and mitigating the effects of climate
change such as flooding and storm damage. This conflict will arise as tax
receipts simultaneously drop through energy price rises.
The impossibility of meeting
these conflicting challenges is the reason that much of the negotiations at
climate change conferences takes place around the positions of the nuclear
weapons states and their need to maintain large military industrial complexes
and competitive and expanding economies to fund these.
The commissioners report has
also failed to recognise the democratic deficit associated with the nuclear
weapons. Virtually every opinion poll in the country shows an overwhelming majority
is against the decision to replace Trident, yet all the main political parties
support replacement, giving the people of this country about as much say in the
decision as those in North Korea. In
these circumstances, it is not acceptable that small bands of experts cast
judgement on the decision to proceed or not.
On a fundamental issue such
as this, where the electorate is denied a say at the ballot box, then in the
interests of democracy, it should be made by a referendum subject to public
debate where the three main questions above can are debated in the open.
Ultimately our best defence
against nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail is to demonstrate the total
irrationality of pursuing these weapon systems in the face of economic and
ecological collapse and to ensure that the subsequent debate is heard
throughout the world. Instead, we have done the opposite and kept quiet on this
painful issue, thus giving the green light for other nations to develop their
nuclear arsenals in response.
As part of this new dialogue,
we should be prepared to call the bluff of potential enemies. The government of
Russia are as aware as us that the use nuclear weapons on any significant scale
would be suicidal through either radioactive fall out, nuclear winter or economic
collapse.
The alternative is to what we
are doing. It is to build at huge expense a nuclear force whilst the nation is
effectively bankrupt that will never provide secure protection from nuclear
attack and merely encourage our competitors to reciprocate. It drives a race to
the bottom where rational decisions on climate change can never taken.
This is of such importance,
that a full public debate must be held, instead of the silence that is largely
surrounding this issue today. I would challenge any member of BASIC's
commission who has concluded we must pursue the Trident replacement to a public
debate, and I am sure many people better than me would also be willing.
Yours sincerely,
Kevin Lister BSc, MBA, MSc
(Contributing author to
"The World in Chains" ISBN
number:978-1-910021-03-3, Luath Press)